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ABSTRACT
The taxation of Sovereign Wealth Funds in the United States is
outmoded and due for reconsideration. Offering a tax exemption to
the billion dollar investment funds owned by foreign governments is
both unfair and ineffective. Founded in the principles of sovereign
immunity, the foreign sovereign tax exemption, codified in I.R.C. §
892, fails to satisfy the Congressional goals that motivated its
creation. This Article explains the current taxation of foreign
sovereigns and, by extension, Sovereign Wealth Funds. It then
illustrates that the current exemption is simultaneously too broad,
providing a tax exemption for activities that are clearly nongovernmental activities, and therefore outside of the realm of
sovereign immunity, and too narrow, failing to provide a tax
exemption for activities that clearly are governmental activities.
Finally, this Article explains that any exemption provided to foreign
sovereigns should be offered only as a treaty matter, reserving the
privilege as a negotiation tool, and thereby ensuring that the United
States receives similar benefits.
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INTRODUCTION
Investment in the United States by Sovereign Wealth Funds
(“SWFs”) has grown significantly in recent years.1 Several high profile
deals have brought this activity into the headlines and have started
conversations about just what SWFs should or should not be permitted
to do.2 However, despite this evolving attitude toward investment in the
United States by foreign governments and the growing presence of
SWFs in the U.S. economy, the taxation of SWFs and the related policy
rationales are sorely outdated. Section 892 of the Internal Revenue Code
1. For a discussion of the growth of SWFs and examples of specific wellpublicized investments by SWFs in the United States in recent years see Joint Comm.
on Tax’n, Economic and U.S. Income Tax Issues Raised by Sovereign Wealth Fund
Investment in the United States, JCX-49-08, at 1 (June 17, 2008); Victor Fleischer, A
Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth, 84 N.Y.U.L. REV. 440, 441-42 (2009); William M.
Funk, On and Over the Horizon: Emerging Issues in U.S. Taxation of Investments, 10
HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 7-8 (2010); Michael S. Knoll, Taxation and the
Competitiveness of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Do Taxes Encourage Sovereign Wealth
Funds to Invest in the United States, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 703, 703-05 (2009); Luca
Schicho, Pride and Prejudice: How the Financial Crisis Made Us Reconsider SWFs, 2
GOETTINGEN J. INT’L. L. 63, 65-70 (2010).
2. See, e.g., Funk, supra note 1; Schicho, supra note 1.
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(the section that provides a tax exemption to foreign governments, and,
by extension, to SWFs) has remained substantially unchanged since it
was written in 1917.3 Now is the time to re-examine the U.S. tax
treatment of foreign governments and SWFs to ensure that our tax law
reflects and encourages the general U.S. policy towards investment by
foreign governments and SWFs in particular.4
In this Article, I demonstrate that the current statutory structure
offers SWFs a tax exemption that is both unfair (because it allows
foreign governments to earn investment income in the United States
without paying tax on that income while not offering a similar
exemption to other similarly situated taxpayers) and incomplete
(because currently the statute does not provide a complete exemption for
income connected with the sovereign activities of foreign governments,
which is the rationale for providing the exemption in the first place). I
will reevaluate historical justifications for offering a tax exemption to
foreign governments to show that those justifications are not served by
the current form of the exemption. I begin by carefully outlining the
current tax treatment of SWFs. I then demonstrate why this statutory
framework fails to promote good U.S. tax policy. Finally, I identify an
alternative statutory model that more adequately satisfies U.S. tax and
foreign policy goals.
Good tax policy might justify offering foreign governments a lower
rate of tax than foreign private investors.5 What I point to in this Article,
however, is that preferential rates for foreign governments and their
investing SWFs should be offered, if at all, only after careful
consideration by Congress, or by tax treaty negotiators. The current
model is an historical accident and both over-taxes and under-taxes
foreign governments earning income in the United States.
Based on the justification of sovereign immunity, the model
adopted by the U.S. tax Code offers a tax exemption to foreign
governments who earn income in their governmental capacity, but taxes
3. Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended as of the date of this Article
[hereafter “Code”]. All citations to sections are citations to the Code unless otherwise
noted.
4. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the non-tax policy concerns regarding
investment by SWFs and foreign governments in the U.S.
5. Id. Part II.C.1 of this paper discusses policy arguments for lowering the tax rate
on investment for foreign governments investing in the U.S.
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income earned from any so-called “commercial activity.”6 However,
despite the intention of taxing foreign governments in this way, the
actual language of the Code exempts income earned from certain
activities that ought to be treated as commercial,7 while simultaneously
taxing income earned by a foreign government engaging in activities
that are central to its sovereign role.8 Targeted changes to the Code
could fix both of these problems, thereby both raising revenue by taxing
foreign governments when they ought to be taxed and honoring
sovereign immunity when governments are acting in a sovereign
capacity.
I. FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY
One of the basic rules of tax policy is that a good policy will
impose tax fairly among taxpayers.9 That is to say, taxpayers in similar
situations will have similar tax bills (so-called horizontal equity), and
taxpayers who are meaningfully differently situated financially will have
proportionately different tax bills (vertical equity).10 One of the primary
rationales for relying on horizontal equity and fairness more generally is
that observing equity principles allows the government to raise
necessary revenue while, at the same time, increasing social equality.11
6. See infra Part II.C. for a discussion of the U.S. tax treatment of foreign
governments and SWFs.
7. See infra Part II.C.3 for a detailed account of the taxation of foreign
governments’ investment income.
8. See infra Part V for a discussion of the current set of rules that inadvertently
taxes foreign governments earning income while engaging in sovereign activities.
9. An in-depth discussion of vertical and horizontal equity is clearly outside of the
scope of this paper. For further discussion of the general concept of horizontal equity,
as well as more general discussions of the issues present in creating good tax policy,
see, e.g., JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO
THE DEBATE OVER TAXES (4th ed. 2008); Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social
Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV.
1905 (1987); Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation 16 VA. TAX REV.
39, 86-98 (1996).
10. “[E]conomists call horizontal equity, the principle that tax liability ought to be
the same for any two families with the same level of well-being – equal treatment of
equals.” Slemrod & Bakija, supra note 9, at 89. It should be noted, however, that there
is a significant line of argument in the tax policy literature debating the role of
horizontal equity in analyzing tax policy choices. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Horizontal
Equity: Measures in Search of Principle, 42 NAT’L TAX J. 113 (1990).
11. Slemrod & Bakija, supra note 9 at 87-90.
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However, this focus on levels of fairness in the domestic context does
not necessarily clarify what role “fairness” should have in evaluating
international tax policy.12 My concern in this Article, however, is not so
much whether we unduly burden international investors earning income
in the United States, but whether we offer unjustified tax preferences to
those investors, thereby both lowering tax revenues and increasing
unfairness in the domestic context. Because the focus of this Article
involves tax preferences offered to foreign government investors (and
not to any other taxpayers), it is useful at this point to examine why,
from a fairness perspective, this might be unjustified.
As a general rule, a tax preference (a lower tax rate, tax credit or
deduction) should only be provided if it contributes to a particular policy
goal.13 Indeed any tax preference that gives certain taxpayers a lower tax
bill than other similarly situated taxpayers is likely a violation of
horizontal equity.14 However, if that preference can be justified because
of the other policy goals that it advances, then Congress may decide to
violate horizontal equity in order to achieve that other goal.15 Examples
of such action by Congress in the Code include the deduction for home
mortgage interest,16 the education tax credits,17 and the accelerated

12. See, e.g., J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Fairness
in International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5
FLA. TAX. REV. 4 (2001) (arguing that ability to pay is a relevant consideration when
evaluating world-wide versus territorial taxation for United States citizens and
residents).
13. Slemrod & Bakija, supra note 9, at 89.
14. However, importantly, it is difficult to determine on what criteria we might
judge situatedness (and its similarity) for horizontal equity purposes when one of the
taxpayers in question is a foreign government. For a discussion of the difficulty of
determining “likeness” when one of the taxpayers being analyzed is a non-resident, see
Fleming, Peroni & Shay, supra note 12, at 314.
15. See id.
16. § 163(h). This deduction allows homeowners to deduct amounts they spend in
interest on their home mortgages. As a result, homeowners will typically have lower tax
bills then other taxpayers who are in the same situation in every respect except that they
rent their homes. The policy goal of this provision is to encourage home ownership
among American taxpayers. For an analysis of the effectiveness of this Code section
and this policy more generally, see Dennis J. Ventry, Jr. The Accidental Deduction: A
History and Critique of the Tax Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 233 (2010).
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depreciation rules.18 Without a clear policy goal, a violation of
horizontal equity would seem to violate one of the central premises of
U.S. tax policy.19 This Article will proceed on this assumption. Indeed,
the ultimate conclusion of this Article will be that there is no clear nontax policy goal that justifies giving a tax preference to the investment
income of foreign governments and their SWFs over and above the tax
treatment of foreign private investors.20

17. § 25A. The Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits are tax credits available to
taxpayers who are enrolled in higher education programs and pay tuition for those
programs. The Hope Credit is only available for the first two years of post-secondary
education, while the Lifetime Learning Credit is available for any other enrolled
student. There are additional limitations based on adjusted gross income and applies to
qualified tuition and related expenses. The policy behind these tax credits is clear
enough—the credits are in place to facilitate lower-income individuals’ enrollment in
higher education courses. For further discussion of these credits, see generally Kerry A.
Ryan, Access Assured: Restoring Progressivity in the Tax and Spending Programs for
Higher Education, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (2008); Sean Stegmaier Tax Incentives for
Higher Education in the Internal Revenue Code: Education Tax Expenditure Reform
and the Inclusion of Refundable Tax Credits, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 135 (2008).
18. § 179. This section allows businesses to take up to $500,000 (for the remainder
of 2011 – the limitation is currently scheduled to drop to $125,000 in 2012 and to
$25,000 for taxable years beginning after 2012) of depreciation as an expense in the
year in which the property is placed into service. Intended to encourage capital
expenditures in the face of a recession, the rule has received mixed reviews regarding
its effectiveness. For more discussion of §179 and its implications, see Gabriel
Aitsebaomo, The Individual Alternative Minimum Tax and the Intersection of the Bush
Tax Cuts: A Proposal for Permanent Reform 23 AKRON TAX J. 109 (2008); James
Edward Maule, No Thanks, Uncle Sam, You Can Keep Your Tax Break, 31 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 81 (2006).
19. See generally Slemrod & Bakija, supra note 9, at 89. On the other hand, the
explosion of tax expenditures means that Congress quite regularly decides to violate its
equity goals in the name of policy. Tax expenditure analysis, the procedure by which
the Code is analyzed from the perspective of the services and subsidies provided
through it, was introduced by Stanley S. Surrey. STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO
TAX REFORM (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1973). For a discussion of
the application of tax expenditure analysis to the international tax world, see J. Clifton
Fleming, Jr., & Robert J. Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis and its
International Dimension, 27 VA. TAX REV. 437 (2008).
20. As a matter of horizontal equity and fairness in tax policy more generally, it
may be that the current tax treatment of foreign private investors ought to be changed as
well. However, that discussion is outside of the scope of this paper. For a discussion of
how to evaluate fairness in international tax policy more generally, see generally
Fleming, Peroni & Shay, supra note 12.
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II. TAXATION OF SWFS
In this Article, I argue for the elimination of the current tax
preferences offered to SWFs. However, in order to understand the
problems with the current approach to taxing SWFs, one must first
understand just what is at stake. Therefore, this Part will explain the
current taxation of foreign governments generally, and SWFs in
particular. This journey requires a short detour into the world of nonresident taxpayers and a side trip into a discussion of “commercial
activity income,” a concept that applies only in the taxation of foreign
sovereigns.
A. WHAT IS A SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND?
There is still no universally recognized definition of the term
“Sovereign Wealth Fund.”21 International organizations like the
International Monetary Fund (the “IMF”), the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (the “OECD”) and the
European Central Bank, however, have working definitions.22 SWFs
generally operate like private equity funds, pooling capital for purposes
21. See Fleischer, supra, note 1, at 453-55 (noting that it is unclear what exactly
counts as a SWF).
22. The IMF identifies five possible types of SWF: “(i) stabilization funds, where
the primary objective is to insulate the budget and the economy against commodity
(usually oil) price swings; (ii) savings funds for future generations, which aim to
convert nonrenewable assets into a more diversified portfolio of assets . . . (iii) reserve
investment corporations, whose assets are often still counted as reserve assets, and are
established to increase the return on reserves; (iv) development funds, which typically
help fund socio-economic projects or promote industrial policies that might raise a
country’s potential output growth; and (v) contingent pension reserve funds, which
provide (from sources other than individual pension contributions) for contingent
unspecified pension liabilities on the government’s balance sheet.” Int’l Monetary Fund
Sovereign Wealth Funds – A Work Agenda 5 (Feb. 29, 2008), available at
www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/022908.pdf. The European Central Bank defines
an SWF as “[a] special investment fund created/owned by a government to hold assets
for long-term purposes; it is typically funded from reserves or other foreign-currency
sources, including commodity export revenues, and predominantly has significant
ownership of foreign currency claims on non-residents.” European Central Bank,
Financial Stability Review 178 (June 2009), available at www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/fin
ancialstabilityreview200906en.pdf.
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of investment.23 However, unlike their private equity fund counterparts,
the capital invested by SWFs is entirely owned by a sovereign entity.
For U.S. tax purposes, and for purposes of this Article, the only entities
that qualify as SWFs are those that are wholly owned by foreign
governments and are otherwise eligible for § 892 benefits.24 In addition,
the financial benefits of the SWF’s income must not inure to any private
persons.25 Finally, in order to qualify for the benefits of the foreign
sovereign tax exemption in the United States, SWFs must not be
engaged in commercial activity anywhere in the world.26
B. U.S. TAX TREATMENT OF FOREIGN PRIVATE CORPORATE
INVESTORS IN THE UNITED STATES
The United States’ system of taxation imposes income taxes based
on both citizenship and residency criteria.27 That is to say, United States
citizens and residents are taxed on their worldwide income.28 Non-U.S.
citizens who are also non-residents, but who earn income that comes

23. “Broadly speaking . . . SWFs are actively managed, government-owned pools
of capital originating in foreign exchange assets.” Joint Comm. on Tax’n, supra note 1,
at 21-22.
24. In order to qualify for the foreign sovereign tax exemption provided by § 892,
an entity must be a controlled entity. A controlled entity “means an entity that is
separate in form from a foreign sovereign or otherwise constitutes a separate juridical
entity if it satisfies the following requirements: (i) [i]t is wholly owned and controlled
by a foreign sovereign directly or indirectly through one or more controlled entities; (ii)
[i]t is organized under the laws of the foreign sovereign by which [it is] owned; (iii)
[i]ts net earnings are credited to its own account or to other accounts of the foreign
sovereign, with no portion of its income inuring to the benefit of any private person;
and (iv) [i]ts assets vest in the foreign sovereign upon dissolution.” Temp. Treas. Reg. §
892-2T(a)(3). SWFs that satisfy these requirements qualify as controlled entities, and
therefore are eligible for the foreign sovereign tax exemption provided by § 892.
25. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.892-2T(a)(2). Note that all of the Treasury Regulations
under § 892 are temporary. The applicable Regulations (Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.8921T—1.892-7T) were adopted as Temporary Regulations in 1986 by § 1247 of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, Pub.L. 99-514, § 1247, 100 Stat. 2085, 2583, and have not yet
been made permanent.
26. §§ 892(a)(2)(A)(ii), 892(a)(2)(B). For a discussion of “commercial activity,”
see infra Part III.
27. See, e.g., §§ 861, 871, 872.
28. § 61.
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from a U.S. source are taxed in the United States on that income.29
However, by contrast with U.S. citizens and residents, non-residents are
not taxed on their worldwide income, but generally are only required to
report and pay tax to the United States government on U.S.-source
income and certain other income connected to a U.S. business.30 This
model of taxation echoes the general source/residence divide found
throughout the world.31 Generally, countries assess income taxes on all
income that is earned within their borders.32 In the United States, “U.S.
source income” includes any payment for services that are provided in
the United States, or any investment income (such as dividend payments
or interest income) that is generated from U.S. based investments.33
Generally, non-residents are also taxed in the United States on
income that is effectively connected to a U.S. trade or business (socalled “effectively connected income” or “ECI”).34 ECI is taxed at the
same ordinary income rates to which U.S. citizens and residents are
subject.35 In addition, nonresidents subject to taxation on ECI are
eligible to take deductions against their income, resulting in a net, rather
than gross, income tax.36 The goal of the ECI rules taxing nonresidents
29. See § 871 and § 872 for the taxation of non-resident individuals and § 881 and
§ 882 for the taxation of non-resident corporations.
30. Id. Section 861 identifies which items of income will be treated as income from
sources within the United States, while § 862 identifies items treated as income from
sources without the United States.
31. See, e.g., RICHARD L. DOERNBERG, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION IN A NUTSHELL,
7 (9th ed. 2012).
32. The source of income is typically attributed to the jurisdiction in which it is
derived. This is not always obvious, and the source of income can be the cause of some
dispute. For a discussion of the ways in which taxpayers attempt to take advantage of
complicated source rules and the gaps between the source rules of various countries, see
Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699 (2011).
33. §§ 861 (identifying income from sources within the United States), 862
(identifying income from sources without the United States), 863 (explaining the
allocation rules for income partially from within and partially from without the United
States), and 865 (explaining the rules for determining the source of gain from the sale
of a capital asset).
34. For the definition of “trade or business within the United States,” see § 864(b).
For the imposition of tax on a non-resident alien on income connected with a United
States trade or business, see § 871(b).
35. §§ 871(b), 882.
36. §§ 861(b), 871(b), 873, 882.
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at resident rates on their U.S. trade or business income is meant to
encourage fairness and competitiveness between nonresidents and
residents. In other words, the tax rules should not provide an unjustified
competitive advantage to those who are exempt from tax, eligible to take
deductions so that they are taxed on net rather than gross income, or
who otherwise receive competitive advantages merely based on tax
treatment. Without clear policy goals indicating otherwise, the
obligation to pay taxes should not put a taxpayer at a disadvantage, as
compared with another individual who is entitled to a tax exemption.
One relevant example of this distinction is found in the world of taxexempt non-profit entities.37 A tax-exemption is provided to non-profit
entities for all income earned by the entity in connection with its
charitable purpose.38 However, if the non-profit earns income from an
“unrelated business” then that income is subject to taxation at the same
rates as a for-profit entity.39 The rationale for this rule is that U.S. tax
policy should not provide a business advantage to non-profit entities
engaging in business outside of their charitable purposes.40 The same
rationale applies in the international tax context. The tax on ECI
attempts to put U.S. taxable businesses and their foreign-owned
competitors operating and earning income in the United States on a taxneutral playing field.41
By contrast with the rule for ECI, non-residents are typically
exempted in the United States from tax on gain from the sale of a capital

37.
38.
39.
40.

§§ 511, 512.
§ 501.
Id.
For an in-depth discussion of the role that the unrelated business income tax
plays in effecting the competitiveness of businesses operated by tax-exempt entities, see
Michael S. Knoll, The UBIT: Leveling an Uneven Playing Field or Tilting a Level
One?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 857 (2007).
41. In addition to the goal of tax neutrality, there are jurisdictional limits to the
U.S. taxation of non-resident businesses. If a non-resident business earns income
outside of the United States, then, for the most part, that income will not be subject to
United States tax. In that sense then, the U.S. business is at a tax disadvantage,
especially if the non-resident is only subject to tax at a lower rate than the United States
tax rate. However, the U.S. lacks the jurisdictional authority to draw that non-U.S.
source income into the U.S. in order to tax it. For a more detailed discussion of this
issue, see Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., & Robert J. Peroni, “What’s Source
Got to Do With It?” Source Rules and U.S. International Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV. 81
(2002).
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asset.42 Because of this rule, appreciation on U.S. stock owned by a
foreign investor goes untaxed in the United States.43 The effective tax
exemption provided by this jurisdictional rule can make investing in the
United States particularly attractive to foreign investors.44
While non-resident taxpayers are subject to U.S. tax on their ECI,
and generally exempt from U.S. tax on their capital gain income, there is
a general rule that income that is fixed, determinable, annual or periodic
(“FDAP income”) is subjected to a 30% withholding rate.45 Examples of
42. §§ 865. See also §§ 881, 882 (identifying the items of income subject to tax on
non-residents engaged in a trade or business in the United States and on non-residents
not engaged in a trade or business in the United States, and omitting capital gain as an
item of income). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-2(b)(2)(i) (excepting gains on the sale
of capital assets from the withholding rules). This treatment of capital gain stems from
generally accepted jurisdictional rules about the source of income. Capital gain is
typically sourced to the residence country of the seller. In the case of a non-resident
taxpayer, therefore, any capital gain earned on a sale is not taxed in the United States.
One exception to this general rule lies in the world of real property interests. § 897
taxes non-residents on income earned from the sale of real property interests to the
seller’s residency, even though that income, as capital gain income, would otherwise be
sourced outside the U.S. An additional exception to the general rule is found in the rules
related to the sale of inventory property. Unlike the sale of other kinds of personal
property, the sale of inventory property retains a “title passage” rule, so that income is
sourced to the country where title passes. § 861(a)(6). Therefore, if a non-resident sells
inventory property in the U.S., that income will be sourced here, and she will likely be
taxed on any gain.
43. Gain earned by a U.S. taxpayer on the sale of a capital asset in the U.S. is
currently taxed at preferential rates. §1(h). This is one aspect of the current system of
corporate double taxation, which assesses an income tax at the level of the corporation
and also assesses a tax at the shareholder level. The distribution of profits results in a
tax on dividends, but if the corporation retains profits, then typically the share price
increases, and there will be capital gain on the sale of the stock, which is taxed at
capital gain rates. One argument for lower rates for capital gains and dividends is that
this income is taxed twice in the United States. For an explanation of the operation of
the double corporate tax and an argument that the U.S. corporate tax is “unusual, unfair
and inefficient,” see Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of
Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE L. J. 325, 326 (1995). However, since capital gain
realized by non-residents escapes this second level of taxation, it may be time to revisit
this issue. That is, however, outside of the scope of this Article.
44. See § 865(a). Since § 865(a) sources gain to the seller’s residency, if a resident
of a country with very low or no income tax earns income on the sale of a stock of a
U.S. company, that seller may avoid tax on the gain altogether.
45. §§ 871(a), 881(a).

998

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVII

FDAP income include dividends, rents, royalties and interest payments,
among other things.46 With regard to dividends, this 30% withholding
rate represents a significant deviation from the current 15% tax on
dividend income that is assessed on the income of U.S. taxpayers.47 In
many instances, non-resident taxpayers who are residents of countries
with whom the United States has a tax treaty will get the benefit of a
dividend withholding rate that is reduced by the treaty.48 Most
commonly, the treaty reduces the withholding rate on non-residents to
15%.49 Because of the “withholding” nature of the tax, the obligation to
collect the tax lies with the income payor.50 If a non-resident believes
she is exempt from the tax, or otherwise eligible for some rate other than
the 30% rate, then she must submit documentation to the payor
establishing the reasons the payor should withhold a reduced amount.51
In addition to the treaty reduction on the dividend withholding rate,
non-residents receive a tax benefit with regard to most interest that they
receive.52 As a general matter, interest income is FDAP income, which

46.
47.

§ 881(a).
See § 61. Note that this rate is part of the EGTRRA tax cuts, which are
currently in place through December 2012, at which point this reduced tax rate may
increase. It is unclear at the time of this writing whether or not this reduced rate will be
extended.
48. Tax treaties are international agreements signed by the United States and the
governing authority of a foreign country. Their authority controls the taxation of each
country’s citizens in the jurisdiction of the other signing country.
49. Generally dividend withholding rates set by treaty are reduced to 15%, but
some countries have signed treaties with the United States that reduce the withholding
rate to a different percentage. Currently reduced dividend withholding rates are in place
in the tax treaties that the United States has signed with Australia, Austria, Bangladesh,
Barbados, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel (25%), Italy, Jamaica, Japan (10%), Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden,
Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and Venezuela.
In each case, see Article 10 of the appropriate treaty except for Israel and Iceland,
where the appropriate provision appears in Article 12, available at http://www.irs.gov
/businesses/international/article/0,,id=96739,00.html.
50. §§ 1441, 1442.
51. Treas. Reg. §1.1441-1(b)(3).
52. See § 871. Note that this is a statutory provision, so eligibility for the tax
benefit is not contingent on eligibility to claim the benefits of a tax treaty, as the
reduced dividend withholding rate is.
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would be subject to the applicable 30% withholding rate.53 However,
U.S. source interest received by a non-resident that qualifies as
“portfolio interest” is exempt from the U.S. income tax.54 The portfolio
interest rules apply to recipients of interest income who are not 10%
shareholders in the entity that issues the note on which the interest is
paid.55 Also, interest that non-residents earn in the United States on
bank deposits or other kinds of short-term interest are exempted from
tax.56
C. U.S. TAX TREATMENT OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS
The default treatment of foreign sovereigns earning income in the
United States is that they are treated as foreign corporations resident in
their home countries.57 This means that, regardless of what additional
tax benefits are afforded to foreign sovereigns, under the current rules,
foreign sovereigns who invest in the United States will be eligible for

53.
54.
55.

§ 871(a) imposes this tax.
§§ 871(h)(2), 881(c).
§ 871(h)(3)(B) The statute provides that “[t]he term ‘10-percent shareholder’
means – (i) in the case of an obligation issued by a corporation, any person who owns
10 percent or more of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock of such
corporation entitled to vote, or (ii) in the case of an obligation issued by a partnership,
any person who owns 10 percent or more of the capital or profits interest in such
partnership.” The Code goes on to apply the traditional § 318 attribution rules in
determining 10-percent ownership in this context. See § 871(h)(3)(C).
56. § 871(i)(2)(A).
57. § 892(a)(3). The statute provides that “[f]or purposes of this title, a foreign
government shall be treated as a corporate resident of its country. A foreign government
shall be so treated for purposes of any income tax treaty obligation of the United States
if such government grants equivalent treatment to the Government of the United
States.” This second sentence is especially noteworthy, since it is a statutory reference
to the treaty status of a foreign government. This provides a precedent for the central
argument of this Article: that the United States should not be offering a tax benefit to a
foreign government if that government does not offer the same benefit back to the U.S.
for income earned by the U.S. in that country. The result of this rule is that foreign
sovereigns will not receive worse tax treatment in the U.S. than the corporate residents
of that country receive. This provision also ensures that foreign sovereigns are eligible
for treaty relief, where that relief is provided to corporate citizens of the relevant
country.
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the tax regime explicated in the previous section.58 However, the U.S.
tax Code offers additional tax benefits to foreign sovereigns, their
controlled entities, and their integral parts.59 I will now turn to a
discussion of these additional benefits, but will first discuss the rationale
for providing a foreign sovereign tax exemption.
1. Why Offer an Additional Tax Advantage to Foreign Sovereigns?
One might ask why the United States would want to provide any
additional tax benefits to foreign sovereigns above and beyond the
benefits that are provided to nonresident taxpayers generally. The
answer is historical, and refers back to the general idea of sovereign
immunity.60 Traditionally in the United States, foreign sovereigns have
been found to be exempt from U.S. jurisdiction.61 This meant that
foreign sovereigns were exempt from both the jurisdiction of U.S. courts
and the jurisdiction of the U.S. taxing authorities.62 “Since the beginning
of the modern federal income tax, the United States has treated
sovereign immunity from taxation as a corollary to the general principle
of sovereign immunity.”63 While this originally applied to all actions
taken by a foreign sovereign within the United States’ borders, Congress
eventually decided to subject foreign sovereigns to the jurisdiction of
U.S. courts when they act in a commercial capacity.64 This same

58. Since they are treated as corporate residents of their home countries, foreign
governments are eligible for all the income tax benefits available to foreign
corporations. These include the portfolio interest benefits of § 881 and the general rule
that capital gain is not taxed to a non-resident corporation. Interestingly, any treaty
reduction of the statutory 30% withholding rate on FDAP income will only be available
to a foreign government if that government treats the U.S. government as a foreign
corporation, for purposes of its income tax rules. See supra note 49 and the
accompanying text for a discussion of the dividend withholding reduction treaty
provisions.
59. See § 892.
60. For a discussion of the issue of sovereign immunity and its relation to the
question of tax treatment of foreign governments, see Gregory May, The Foreign
Sovereign Tax Exemption, TAX NOTES 389 (Jan. 19, 2009) at 390.
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. Id (“Borne on winds stirred by the mid-century rise of political systems that
treated entire economies as public enterprises, a restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity began to etch a distinction between foreign governments’ public activities
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treatment then appeared in the tax Code.65 Sovereign immunity and this
judicial and tax treatment of foreign sovereigns operating within
domestic borders are not entirely uniform.66 That is, many countries
other than the United States offer judicial but not tax immunity to
foreign sovereigns.67
The effect of the United States choosing to treat foreign sovereigns
as corporate residents of their countries is that any additional tax rules
regarding foreign sovereigns will merely improve their tax treatment.68
At worst, foreign sovereigns will default to the tax rules applicable to
foreign corporations resident in that country.69 This is a policy decision.
There might very well be reasons to tax foreign sovereigns more heavily
(or less heavily) than we tax foreign private investors.70 I will discuss
this issue later in this Article.71

(public acts) and what seemed to be their commercial activities (private acts).”)
(internal citation omitted).
65. For a thorough discussion of the history of the exemption, and the relation
between the general principles of sovereign immunity and immunity from tax, see
Fleischer, supra note 1, at 457-61; May, supra note 60, at 389-91.
66. May, supra note 60, at 389.
67. Id.
68. A foreign government can always be treated as a foreign corporation for tax
purposes because that is the default treatment for such entities. If the foreign
government is eligible for any other tax preference beyond that baseline, it will merely
serve to improve the foreign government’s tax result.
69. Importantly, this rule may result in foreign governments receiving better tax
treatment than foreign corporations resident in another country. For instance, if country
A has many favorable treaty provisions that apply to its resident corporations, but
country B does not have such provisions in its treaty with the U.S., or has no treaty in
place with the U.S., then country A’s government will receive better tax treatment than
a corporation resident in country B. In addition, country A’s government will receive
better tax treatment than country B’s government.
70. For a discussion of why a rational foreign policy might involve a heavier tax on
foreign governments than on foreign private investors, see Fleischer, supra note 1, at
480-94 (identifying the positive and negative externalities associated with departing
from the so-called “neutrality norm” with regard to taxation of foreign sovereigns).
71. See infra Part IV.
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2. Who Qualifies for the Exemption for Foreign Sovereigns
The benefit provided to foreign sovereigns by the Code is available
not only to foreign governments themselves, but also to the “integral
parts” and “controlled entities” of those governments.72 Integral parts
include agencies and departments of the foreign government.73 By
contrast, “[c]ontrolled entities are separate legal persons wholly owned
and controlled by the sovereign that do not have governmental
authority.”74 Controlled entities, even though they are legally distinct
from the foreign sovereign, benefit from the tax treatment of foreign
sovereigns because of their status as entities that are wholly owned by a
foreign sovereign.75 However, this treatment only applies to entities that
are not “controlled commercial entities.”76 A controlled commercial
entity is an entity that is effectively owned by a foreign sovereign, and
that engages in commercial activity anywhere in the world.77 If a
controlled entity engages in commercial activity and thereby rises to the
level of a controlled commercial entity, as defined in the Code, then it

72. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.892-2T(a)(1) (“The term ‘foreign government’
means only the integral parts or controlled entities of a foreign sovereign”). The
Treasury Regulation goes on to define both “integral part” and “controlled entity.”
An ‘integral part’ of a foreign sovereign is any person, body of persons, organization,
agency, bureau, fund, instrumentality, or other body, however designated, that
constitutes a governing authority of a foreign country. The net earnings of the
governing authority must be credited to its own account or to other accounts of the
foreign sovereign, with no portion inuring to the benefit of any private person.

Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.892-2T(a)(2).
The term ‘controlled entity’ means an entity that is separate in form from a foreign
sovereign or otherwise constitutes a separate juridical entity if it satisfies the
following requirements: (i) [i]t is wholly owned and controlled by a foreign sovereign
directly or indirectly through one or more controlled entities; (ii) [i]t is organized
under the laws of the foreign sovereign by which owned; (iii) [i]ts net earnings are
credited to its own account or to other accounts of the foreign sovereign, with no
portion of its income inuring to the benefit of any private person; and (iv) [i]ts assets
vest in the foreign sovereign upon dissolution.

Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.892-2T(a)(3).
73. Treas. Reg. § 1.892-2T(a)(2).
74. May, supra note 60, at 391.
75. “[An SWF] formed to provide resources for the support of governmental
functions and the common welfare generally is a controlled entity of the foreign
government.” Id. at 392.
76. § 892(a)(2).
77. Id; see also May, supra note 60, at 391-92.
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will not be entitled to claim the tax benefits afforded to foreign
sovereigns.78 The argument for this distinction is similar to the rationale
behind the tax treatment of ECI to foreign private investors.79 A
controlled entity that is engaged in commercial activity will be
competing with U.S. commercial entities.80 Offering a tax exemption to
a controlled commercial entity would provide that entity (and the
foreign sovereign who controls it) with a significant competitive
advantage over its U.S. commercial counterpart. The policy of sovereign
immunity does not justify providing foreign governments with such a
competitive advantage. Therefore, any controlled entity that engages in
commercial activity loses the tax benefit for foreign sovereigns.81
Clearly, this is a strong incentive for foreign sovereigns and their
controlled entities to avoid engaging in commercial activity.82
3. Tax Benefits for Foreign Sovereigns
Again, foreign sovereigns are, at a minimum, eligible for treatment
as foreign corporate residents of their home countries.83 However, in
addition to this (relatively advantageous) tax treatment, foreign
sovereigns and their integral parts and controlled entities are also
eligible for the tax benefits provided by § 892.84 The tax preferences
78. § 892(a)(2); see also May, supra note 60, at 391-92 (“Because sovereigns
govern through their integral parts, integral parts receive wider immunity. They can
engage in commercial activities without losing the sovereign exemption for their
noncommercial income. Controlled entities cannot. If they engage in any commercial
activity, they lose their sovereign exemption entirely.”) (emphasis added).
79. See supra Part II.B.
80. This raises the question of what import it should have for U.S. tax purposes if a
controlled entity is engaged in commercial activity outside the U.S. Currently, any
commercial activity that a controlled entity engages in anywhere in the world will be
sufficient to cause that entity to be treated as a controlled commercial entity for U.S. tax
purposes. However, if the point of the provision is to level the playing field with regard
to commercial activities engaged in within the U.S., then it is not immediately clear
why non-U.S. activity should be a relevant factor.
81. § 892(a)(2).
82. “The typical concern of a[n SWF] is involvement in investments that might
cause it to become taxable as a controlled commercial entity.” May, supra note 60, at
392.
83. § 892(a)(3).
84. See id. § 892(a)(1).
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provided in § 892 are statutorily provided benefits available to all
foreign sovereigns earning income in the United States.85 As addressed
earlier, the United States is a signatory to many tax treaties, some of
which offer additional benefits to foreign sovereigns of the other
signatory country.86 Later in this Article I will discuss the possibility of
making the foreign sovereign tax exemption a treaty benefit, thereby
limiting its extent, and simultaneously strengthening the U.S. position in
asking for reciprocal treatment.87 For the moment, it is sufficient to
remember that any benefits provided by § 892 are available to all
foreign governments, their integral parts, and any of their controlled
entities that are not controlled commercial entities.
Section 892 exempts from U.S. taxation any investment income
earned by a foreign government, its integral parts, or its controlled
entities that is not earned from a commercial activity.88 The language of
the statute provides an exemption, not on the basis of whether or not the
income earned by the foreign sovereign is connected with the sovereign,
governmental activities of that entity, but only if the income comes from
investments or interest on deposits.89 The statute focuses the exemption
on income earned from what are traditionally viewed as passive (or noncommercial) activities.90 Indeed, the statute goes on to explicitly remove
any income derived from commercial activities from the exemption
provided by the previous paragraph.91 Reading these two paragraphs
together, income of foreign governments from stocks or bonds, if
derived from a commercial activity, will not qualify for the foreign

85. See generally id. § 892.
86. Supra note 49 and accompanying text.
87. For a discussion of this issue, see infra section VII.
88. § 892.
89. § 892(a) (emphasis added).
(1) In general. The income of foreign governments received from – (A) investments in
the United States in – (i) stocks, bonds, or other domestic securities owned by such
foreign governments, or (ii) financial instruments held in the execution of
governmental financial or monetary policy, or (B) interest on deposits in banks in the
United States of moneys belonging to such foreign governments, shall not be included
in gross income and shall be exempt from taxation under this subtitle.
90. See id. Investing in stocks and bonds and earning interest on bank deposits are

traditionally viewed as passive sources of income, also within the world of tax-exempt
entities and the Unrelated Business Income Tax. See infra, Part VI.
91. “Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any income (i) derived from the conduct of
any commercial activity (whether within or outside the United States) . . . .” Id.
§ 892(a)(2)(A).
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sovereign tax exemption, even though such income would qualify for
that exemption if it had not been earned commercially.
Remember, though, that income earned by the foreign sovereign in
the form of interest on bank deposits (provided that the interest income
was not earned in connection with a trade or business in the United
States) would be exempt regardless of the application of § 892, because
of the application of the exemption for interest on deposits provided in
§ 871.92 Because the foreign sovereign receives all the tax benefits
available to foreign corporations, the benefits of portfolio interest and
the exemption for interest on deposits that are available to foreign
corporations will also be available to foreign sovereigns, even if the
income does not qualify for the exemption provided by § 892.93 As a
result, the effect of § 892 is the tax exemption it provides to income
earned in the form of dividends, where the dividend is primarily
attributable to corporate income earned in the United States.94
Importantly, the benefits available to foreign sovereigns under
§ 892 are not available if the foreign sovereign (or its integral parts or
controlled entities) is engaged in commercial activity.95 Unlike foreign
private investors and the analysis applied to ECI, commercial activity by
the foreign sovereign anywhere in the world will make that foreign
sovereign ineligible for the benefits of the foreign sovereign tax
exemption.96 Any income earned by a foreign sovereign that is derived
from a commercial activity will be “commercial activity income”
(“CAI”) and will be ineligible for the benefits of § 892.97
One of the particularly severe elements of this rule stems from the
“tainting” nature of commercial activity income. Obviously, any income

92.
93.
94.

§ 871(i).
§§ 892(a)(3), 871(h).
§ 871(i). If the dividend is a payout of income earned primarily outside the
United States, and if the dividend is paid to an owner with the relevant ownership
percentage of the payor corporation, then the dividend would already be exempt from
U.S. tax under the Code. See § 871(i)(2)(B).
95. § 892(a)(2) (dealing with “Income Received Directly or Indirectly from
Commercial Activities”).
96. Id. (“IN GENERAL – Paragraph (1) [providing a tax exemption] shall not
apply to any income – (i) derived from the conduct of any commercial activity (whether
within or outside the United States) . . . .”).
97. Id.
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that is itself earned by engaging in a commercial activity will be CAI. 98
However, in addition, any other income—that is, income that is not by
its origins CAI—is also treated as CAI if earned by the same entity that
earned the CAI.99 That is to say, CAI taints non-CAI, making all income
earned by an entity that earns any CAI ineligible for the foreign
sovereign tax exemption.100
Foreign sovereigns have a strong incentive to avoid engaging in
activities that generate CAI.101 However, even if they do earn income
that is statutorily defined as income generated by a commercial activity,
foreign sovereigns are not subject to higher tax rates on that income than
foreign private investors would be.102 But foreign sovereigns can easily
plan around the tainting rule in order to isolate CAI and limit the
possibility of tainting other income. Because income is not attributed
from one of a foreign government’s controlled entities to another of its
controlled entities, any foreign sovereign that expects to earn CAI can
create an entity specifically to engage in activities expected to generate
CAI. Doing so keeps that income segregated from any other income that
is not CAI. While this structuring work can be expensive, it is a
relatively straightforward way to avoid the tainting problem. Having one
investment vehicle that only generates non-CAI, and a separate vehicle
where all investments that might generate CAI are held, ensures that the
98.
99.

§ 892(a)(2)(A)-(B).
§ 892(a)(2)(A)(ii) & (B). Because engaging in any commercial activity at all
makes a controlled entity into a controlled commercial entity, and because any income
earned by a controlled commercial entity is ineligible for the exemption, the
commercial activity in effect taints the other non-commercial income of the controlled
commercial entity. For instance, if a corporation that is wholly owned by a foreign
government earns commercial income by operating a business, the corporation will
meet the definition of a “controlled commercial entity.” As a result, all of its income
will be ineligible for the § 892 exemption, even though some of its income might be
dividend income resulting from the passive ownership of publicly traded stock. If the
foreign government owned the stock through another entity that was not a controlled
commercial entity, then the dividend would be eligible for the § 892 exemption. The
mere existence of some CAI earned by the controlled entity taints all the other income
earned by that same entity.
100.
Id.
101.
Income that is not identified as CAI and is not tainted by CAI is eligible for
the exemption provided in § 892. Earning CAI makes an entity ineligible for those
benefits. Therefore foreign sovereigns will want to minimize the amount of income
they earn that is identified as CAI, and, if the generation of CAI is inevitable, they will
want to isolate the CAI from all other income.
102.
§ 892(a)(3).
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non-CAI vehicle will qualify for the foreign sovereign tax exemption.103
The CAI-generating vehicle will not qualify for the foreign sovereign
tax exemption, but will still receive the relatively beneficial treatment
afforded to foreign private corporations, provided that the income is not
ECI.104
D. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN PRIVATE
CORPORATE INVESTORS AND FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS
The exemption provided in § 892 provides important additional tax
exemptions to the already preferential tax treatment received by foreign
sovereigns due to their treatment as corporate residents of their own
countries. Perhaps most notably, any dividends, which would be taxed
for a foreign private investor at 30% (or a treaty-reduced 15% rate),105
would be eligible for a complete tax exemption if received by a foreign
sovereign.106 The effect of this, while advantageous for all foreign
sovereigns, is particularly advantageous for foreign sovereigns who
have not signed a treaty with the United States.107 For these countries,
the withholding rate on dividend payments is reduced from 30% to
zero.108 Even for countries that have signed tax treaties with the United
States, the lowest dividend withholding rate that the United States
103.
104.

§ 892(a)(1) & (2).
Because foreign sovereigns are, as a default treated as corporate residents of
their countries, the commercial activity analysis is not necessary for determining all of
their tax treatment. The tax treatment of a foreign sovereign’s income under the
corporate non-resident rules will not depend on whether or not the entity has any
income from a commercial activity. See § 892(a)(3).
105. § 871(a)(1); see also supra note 49 and accompanying text.
106. Dividends are income from investments, and therefore qualify for the
exemption provided by § 892.
107. Without a treaty benefit in place, foreign governments, subject to tax as foreign
corporate investors from their home countries, would be subject to a withholding rate of
30% on dividend payments received from the U.S. § 871.
108. § 892(a)(1). Note that, from a certain perspective, this may be a strong
argument in favor of leaving the foreign sovereign tax exemption as a statutory benefit,
rather than making it a treaty provision, as I argue later in this Article. Because it is
typically only the relatively wealthy and powerful countries that have negotiated tax
treaties with the United States, the costs of removing the statutorily provided tax
preferences for foreign governments will fall most heavily on poorer and less politically
powerful countries. For a further discussion of this issue, see infra Part VII.
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typically agrees to is generally around 15%,109 so the statutory provision
that lowers that rate to zero is meaningfully beneficial to all foreign
sovereign recipients of dividends.110
The primary additional benefit that foreign sovereigns receive as a
result of § 892 relates to the taxation of interest. The only kinds of
interest exempted from tax for foreign private corporate investors, as
discussed above, are so-called “portfolio interest” and interest on
deposits in banks.111 By contrast, § 892 provides foreign sovereigns,
their integral parts and their controlled (non-commercial) entities, with a
tax exemption for all earned interest.112 The effect of this, while
relatively minor since § 871 exempts most types of interest, is that
interest paid where the foreign sovereign is a greater than 10% owner of
the issuer is still exempt from tax for that foreign sovereign.113 A
similarly situated foreign private investor would be subject to
withholding and income tax on that interest.114
III. WHAT IS “COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY”?
Any income that is generated to a foreign sovereign by engaging in
a commercial activity will be ineligible for the foreign sovereign tax
exemption.115 Clearly, then, one must understand just what commercial
activity is. The Treasury Regulations under § 892 define commercial
activity for purposes of the foreign sovereign tax exemption.116 This
definition is remarkably broad. Anything that is an activity “with a view
towards the current or future production of income or gain” is a
commercial activity.117 This broad definition is narrowed by an explicit
109.
110.

See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
“The principal benefits of the sovereign exemption . . . are limited to portfolio
dividends, contingent interest, interest from non controlled, 10% owned entities, and
gain on interests in non-controlled U.S. real property holding corporations.” May, supra
note 60, at 391.
111. § 871(h)-(i); see also supra notes 54 to 56 and accompanying text.
112. § 892(a)(1)(B).
113. Section 871 would not apply in such a scenario, but § 892 exempts all interest,
regardless of ownership of the borrower.
114. § 871.
115. § 892(a)(2).
116. Treas. Reg. § 1.892-4T(b).
117. Id. (“In general. Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, all
activities (whether conducted within or outside the United States) which are ordinarily
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list of excluded activities.118 The excluded activities are primarily
pursuits that are traditionally considered to be within the purview of
governmental activities, such as cultural events, governmental functions
and purchasing.119 Remember, the primary argument for offering a tax
exemption to foreign governments in the first instance was a
jurisdictional argument about the sovereign immunity of those foreign
governments.120 On the sovereign immunity argument, these are the
activities that should be exempted for foreign governments. In these
instances, the foreign government is acting in its capacity as a foreign
sovereign, and therefore, on sovereign immunity grounds, it should be
entitled to a U.S. tax exemption. These particular activities, however,
are not performed by SWFs.121 Most relevant for foreign sovereigns
planning to invest in the United States, usually through a SWF, is the
first activity that is identified in the Treasury Regulations as noncommercial: investing.122 According to the Treasury Regulations,
“investments in stocks, bonds and other securities, loans, [and]
investments in financial instruments held in the execution of
government financial or monetary policy . . . ” are not commercial
activity. 123 While investing is clearly engaged in with a “view towards
the current or future production of income or gain,” the exclusion of
investing from the definition of commercial activity parallels the
definition of ECI for foreign private investors. 124 Again, the difference

conducted by the taxpayer or by other persons with a view towards the current or future
production of income or gain are commercial activities. An activity may be considered
a commercial activity even if such activity does not constitute the conduct of a trade or
business in the United States under section 864(b).”).
118. § 1.892-4T(c) (“Activities that are not commercial. – (1) Investments . . . (2)
Cultural Events. . . (3) Non-profit activities . . . (4) Governmental functions . . . (5)
Purchasing . . . .”).
119. Id.
120. See supra notes 60 to 71 and accompanying text.
121. Remember the definition of SWFs offered earlier in this article—these are not
governments operating in a governmental capacity, but merely pools of capital
investing with the same goal as any other investor. See supra Part II.A.
122. Treas. Reg. § 1.892-4T(c)(1).
123. Id. § 1.892-4T(c)(1)(i).
124. This is the language used to define “commercial activity.” Treas. Reg. § 1.8924T(b).
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relates to the “passive” or “active” nature of the activity that generates
the income.125
The Regulations go on to treat as “non-commercial” income that is
earned by a foreign government by engaging in trading.126 The Treasury
Regulations state that “effecting transactions in stocks, securities, or
commodities for a foreign government’s own account does not
constitute a commercial activity . . . .”127 Traditionally, trading is viewed
as a less-passive (more active) income-producing activity than investing.
However, the list of trading activities that are not commercial activities
is more expansive than the list of investing activities that is included in
the Regulations.128 In particular, the Regulations include trading
commodities as a non-commercial activity, whereas investing in
commodities is not explicitly identified as a non-commercial activity.129
There is currently significant debate about the implications of this
distinction, and the confusion about whether or not investing in
commodities is, in fact, a commercial activity that will “taint” the other
non-commercial income earned by an SWF in any particular year is
likely having an effect on the amount of SWF investment in
commodities.
What is important to note here is that the list of “non-commercial”
activities in the Treasury Regulations is meant to encompass the world
of governmental activities entitled to sovereign immunity.130 It is these
activities that Congress intended to exempt from tax when creating the
foreign sovereign tax exemption. This adds to the incongruity of finding

125.
126.
127.
128.

Id; see also infra Part VI.
Id. § 1.892-4T(c)(ii).
Id.
In particular, the Treasury Regulations explicitly identify trading in
commodities as a non-commercial activity, but do not explicitly identify investing in
commodities as non-commercial. One might extrapolate from trading back to the (less
active) activity of investing, but it does seem strange that the Regulations explicitly
include commodities in one subsection and not the other. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.8924T(c)(i) (identifying non-commercial investing activities, and not including investing in
commodities), with Treas. Reg. § 1.892-4T(c)(ii) (identifying non-commercial trading
activities, and explicitly including trading in commodities).
129. While this might seem an obvious point, there is a significant debate on this
issue currently. In particular, see May, supra note 60, at 395-97; N.Y. ST. B.A. TAX
SEC., REPORT ON THE TAX EXEMPTION FOR FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS UNDER SECTION 892
OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 19-20, 27, 39-40 (2008).
130. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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“investing” on this list.131 A further discussion of how investing is
viewed as “non-commercial” (or “non-business,” depending on the
section) in other Code sections appears later in this Article.132
IV. NON-TAX POLICY CONCERNS REGARDING
INVESTMENTS BY SWFS
If there were strong policy reasons for encouraging SWFs to invest
in the United States then, absent other strong countervailing policy
reasons (tax or otherwise) to discourage investment, the tax law should
be crafted to encourage that investment. However, the non-tax rationale
for encouraging SWF investment in the United States has not yet been
clearly stated. On the contrary, there are strong reasons to be concerned
about SWFs investing in the United States, and to establish a tax policy
that does not unnecessarily encourage such investment.
One of the most commonly repeated concerns regarding investment
by SWFs (and, by implication, their foreign government owners) relates
to national security concerns.133 This argument centers around the
thought that a foreign government can obtain meaningful amounts of
power over the United States through the use of its SWF by establishing
the SWF as a significant actor in the U.S. economy and thereby
becoming the owner of large amounts of U.S. equity interests. This
power could exert itself in a number of ways. First, the foreign
government, acting through the SWF, could negatively influence the
U.S. economy by selling off large amounts of stock. Clearly any such
action would also negatively affect the SWF itself, lowering the value of
its U.S. investments. This would not be the action of a rational economic
actor, and, indeed there is no evidence of any SWF engaging in such
actions thus far.134 However, the possibility remains, and any tax policy
131. Indeed, it feels a bit like that old Sesame Street song “One of These Things is
Not Like the Others.”
132. See infra Part VI.
133. See Joint Comm. on Tax’n, Economic and U.S. Income Tax Issues Raised by
Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment in the United States, supra note 1, at 30.
134. For a discussion of the behavior of SWFs and their investment strategies, see
Lynann Butkiewicz, Nicholas Pettifer & Tom Young, Panic, 27 INT’L FIN. L. REV 22
(2008); Philip Lader, Massive, Passive and Patient . . . or Naughty Knights to the
Rescue?, 43 INTL. SOC’Y BARRISTERS Q. 403 (2008); Richard A. Epstein & Amanda M.
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decision should reflect this possibility. Second, a foreign government,
acting through its SWF, may take advantage of its ownership interest in
a U.S. company to gain access to critical information, or to force the
company to act in such a way that the SWF-controlled U.S. company
becomes less competitive than its counterpart located in the SWF’s
home country. Again, there is no evidence of a SWF having acted in
such a way, and, in fact, SWFs have not yet taken more than a 10%
ownership interest in any U.S. company.135 But, again, such scenarios
should be contemplated when crafting a coherent tax policy.
On the other hand, encouraging foreign governments to invest in
the United States may have positive consequences for national security.
Having a foreign government intricately invested in the stability of the
United States’ economy will give these governments a financial
incentive to help protect the United States and its economy.136 Any
economic instability or security threat to the United States would have a
meaningful financial impact on the SWFs invested here—an impact that
the beneficiaries of those SWFs (the foreign governments themselves)
will want to avoid. Therefore, on this theory, extensive SWF
entanglement in the United States economy will positively affect
national security and economic stability, to the extent that foreign
governments have influence on those issues.
As is clear from this discussion, there may be non-tax policy
reasons to encourage SWFs to invest in the United States economy, but
simultaneously there may be reasons to raise hurdles to such investment.
Until there is clear legislative intent regarding investment by SWFs in
the United States, tax policy should neither encourage nor discourage
such investment, as compared to the general tax approach to investment
by foreign entities. Unfortunately, the current statutory arrangement
offers an additional tax advantage to foreign governments and SWFs

Rose, The Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Virtues of Going Slow, 76 U.
CHI. L. REV. 111, 111 (2009); Justin O’Brien, Barriers to Entry: Foreign Direct
Investment and the Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 42 INT’L LAW. 1231 (2008);
Brendan J. Reed, Sovereign Wealth Funds: The New Barbarians at the Gate? An
Analysis of the Legal and Business Implications of Their Ascendancy, 4 VA. L. & BUS.
REV. 97, 99 (2009).
135. See Butkiewicz et al., supra note 134, at 2.
136. This analysis of investment is not new. As the proverb goes, “If you owe the
bank $100, that’s your problem. If you owe the bank $100 million, that’s the bank’s
problem.”
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beyond what is available to foreign investors more generally.137 This tax
subsidy is unjustified, as there is no current policy objective that the
subsidy achieves.
V. INCOMPLETENESS OF THE CURRENT RULE
If the rationale for offering foreign governments a tax exemption is
to respect their autonomy and their immunity from U.S. jurisdiction
while performing governmental activities, then the current form of § 892
and the affiliated Treasury Regulations fail in two respects. The rule is
both too broad, offering a tax exemption for activities that are not, in
fact, governmental activities, and too narrow, failing to provide a tax
exemption for certain income earned by foreign governments while
performing governmental activities. In this Part, I will turn to the
narrowness concern.
As I discussed earlier in this Article, the current rule providing a
tax exemption for investment income to foreign governments earning
such income in the United States cannot be justified by reference to the
general rule of sovereign immunity.138 The current jurisdictional
sovereign immunity rules provide immunity from the U.S. court system
only to the extent that the foreign sovereign is engaged in a government
activity. Congress has determined, however, that foreign governments
engaged in commercial (as opposed to governmental) activity are
subject to the jurisdictional authority of the U.S. courts.139 The tax rule
attempts to track this distinction by allowing an exemption from United
States taxation if income is earned by a foreign government engaged in
governmental activities, but simultaneously denies that exemption to
any income earned by a foreign government as a result of a “commercial

137. In response to this, one might argue that there is also a tax preference for
foreign investors that is not available to domestic investors. Indeed, non-resident
taxpayers do not pay U.S. capital gain tax on investment gains they earn on U.S.
securities, while their domestic counterparts are subject to that tax. If the taxpayer is
resident in a country without a capital gains tax, such as Switzerland, then that taxpayer
will receive her gains tax-free. This may also be an unjustified tax preference, but an
analysis of that particular argument is outside of the scope of this Article.
138. See supra Part III.
139. Id.
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activity.”140 Again, the rationale for taxing a foreign sovereign’s income
from commercial activities is that a foreign government acting in a
commercial capacity is a competitor to a U.S. resident taxpayer engaged
in the same commercial activity. Providing a tax exemption to the
foreign government would give that foreign government an unjustified
competitive advantage. In addition, since the foreign government is not
engaging in governmental activities related to its sovereign
responsibilities, the rationale of sovereign immunity should not apply.
Tax policy considerations that compete with the principle of sovereign
immunity argue in favor of ensuring the competitiveness of resident
taxpayers in the commercial arena, at least to the extent this can be
affected by federal taxation. However, despite this tax policy goal, as I
have already explained, the Code and the Regulations go on to except
investment activity from the definition of commercial activity.141
Therefore, foreign government investors receive a tax-based competitive
advantage as compared with their non-government foreign counterparts,
and their U.S. resident counterparts, in the arena of investing.
If the rationale for excluding commercial activities from the tax
exemption provided to foreign governments is that commercial activities
are not governmental activities, it is difficult to see how “investing” is
properly categorized as a non-commercial (and therefore governmental)
activity. Excluding investing from the definition of commercial activity
means that foreign governments receive a tax exemption for income
earned from investing, which seems to be primarily a non-governmental
activity.142
By contrast (and here is where the rule seems importantly too
narrow), income earned by a foreign government that is earned from a
governmental activity, but where that activity is not investment-related
140.
141.
142.

See § 892(a)(2)(A).
See Treas Reg. § 1.892-4T(c)(1).
One can imagine that this exemption for investing, when it was drafted in 1917,
applied in very specific cases, radically different from its current application to SWFs.
Imagine, for instance, that the government of France opens a new consulate in the
United States. France will likely open bank accounts to support its consulate, and may
even have certificates of deposit or a money market account in order to keep up with
inflation. The exemption provided by § 892 protects any income France earns on these
accounts from U.S. taxation. However, this example conceives of “investing” as a
radically different thing than the current version of investing by SWFs, which more
closely resembles the classic private equity model, and likely involves significantly
higher dollar amounts accruing annually to the investors..
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will be ineligible for the exemption.143 This unintended consequence
violates the policy rationale for providing the exemption in the first
place. Sovereign immunity justifies exempting income earned by
foreign governments in the performance of governmental activities.
Whether that income comes in the form of investment income, or in
another form altogether should be irrelevant to the provision of the
exemption.
The unintended taxation of the non-commercial, non-investment
income of foreign governments arises because of the structure of the
statute. Section 892(a)(1) states that income from investing or earned as
interest on bank deposits is exempt from tax. Then Section 892(a)(2)
says that if the income referred to in § 892(a)(1) is income from a
commercial activity then it is not exempt.144 The Treasury Regulations
go on to define commercial activity.145 But pause here for a moment.
The only exemption offered in § 892 is to income earned by investment
activity.146 There is no statutory tax exemption for income of a foreign
government earned while engaging in governmental activities unless
that income is investment income.147
Imagine how this tax rule might apply in the case of a foreign
government participating in a cultural festival in the United States. The
foreign government may earn some income from its participation in the
festival, perhaps from the sale of tickets, t-shirts or souvenirs. The
Treasury Regulations under § 892 explicitly state that participation in
cultural events is not commercial activity for the purposes of § 892.148
However, does this mean that the income earned by this foreign
government is therefore exempt from U.S. taxation? Not under the
current statute. In order to qualify for the exemption provided by § 892,
the income earned by the foreign government must be income from
investment.149 This imagined income from a cultural festival is clearly
not income from “investment in the United States in stocks, bonds, or
See § 892(a)(1). Only income from investments and interest on deposits are
exempted under § 892.
144. § 892(a)(1)-(2).
145. Treas. Reg. §1.892-4T(b).
146. § 892(a)(1).
147. Id.
148. Treas. Reg. §1.892-4T(c)(2).
149. § 892(a)(1).

143.
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other domestic securities . . . or . . . financial instruments held in the
execution of governmental financial or monetary policy, or . . . interest
on deposits in banks in the United States . . . ” which is the language
authorizing a tax exemption for foreign governments.150 Therefore, this
income would not benefit from the § 892 exemption, and would, in fact,
be subject to tax in the United States.
This example illustrates the way in which the structure of Section
892 violates the policy behind providing the foreign sovereign tax
exemption. The Treasury Department identified participation in cultural
events as the kind of governmental activity that it had in mind when it
listed such activity as an exception from “commercial activity” in the
Treasury Regulations.151 But the current statutory structure ends up
taxing income earned from that activity, rather than providing an
exemption. A better model would provide a clear exemption for income
earned by engaging in governmental activities, and then make an
exception for commercial activities, rather than identifying income from
investment as the only income for which the exemption will be
provided.
VI. ACTIVE/PASSIVE DISTINCTION IN THE TAX CODE
The distinction between commercial and non-commercial activity
in the context of the income earned by foreign governments in the
United States has parallels in other sections of the Code. Indeed, many
Code sections make a distinction for tax purposes between income that
is earned actively and income that is earned passively.152 For instance,
not-for-profit entities that qualify for a tax-exemption under § 501(c)(3)
may earn income that is unrelated to their tax-exempt purpose on a tax-

150.
151.

Id.
Treas. Reg. § 1.892-4T(c)(2) (“Cultural Events – Performances and exhibitions
within or outside the United States of amateur athletic events and events devoted to the
promotion of the arts by cultural organizations are not commercial activities”).
152. See, e.g., § 864(b)(2)(A)(ii) (stating that trading in securities or commodities
for a taxpayer’s own account does not rise to the level of a trade or business for U.S. tax
purposes), and § 512(a)-(b) (defining “unrelated business taxable income” in the area of
tax-exempt organizations, and then exempting from the definition of “unrelated
business taxable income” “all dividends, interest, payments with respect to securities
loans . . . amounts received or accrued as consideration for entering into agreements to
make loans, and annuities, and all deductions directly connected with such income”).
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free basis, as long as it is passive investment income.153 However, any
income that a non-profit actively earns from engaging in a trade or
business unrelated to its exempt purpose is taxed at corporate rates,
rather than qualifying for exemption from federal income tax.154 The
typical justification for this treatment follows the same lines as the
argument for taxing foreign governments on their income from
commercial activity. If a non-profit entity were exempt from tax on its
income from a commercial activity (so called “unrelated business
taxable income” or “UBTI”), then it would have a competitive
advantage compared with for-profit entities in the same field. If the
activity in question is unrelated to the exempt purpose of the non-profit,
then that advantage is unjustified.155 However, if the income is earned
through passive investments, then the non-profit is exempt from tax on
the income that it earns. 156
The argument for allowing non-profit entities to earn tax-free
investment income centers on their tax-exempt status. Generally
speaking, if the entity is not-for-profit and has a charitable purpose, then
its income should be exempt from tax, unless there is a clear reason to
tax the income in question. The reason to tax unrelated business income
is to avoid providing the entity with an unfair competitive advantage.
There is no such competitive advantage with regard to investment
income, therefore there is no need to impose tax on it. We can, as a
policy matter, accept the tax-free nature of the non-profit’s investment
income because the income will further the charitable purposes of the
non-profit.
This may be a convincing argument with respect to non-profits, as
Congress and the IRS have made explicit decisions to exempt those
entities from tax, and have identified the charitable purposes that justify

153.
154.

See, e.g., § 512(b)(1).
See § 511 (imposing tax on the unrelated business income of charitable
organizations), § 512(a) (defining unrelated business taxable income).
155. For a discussion of the rationale for instituting a tax on the unrelated business
income of charitable organizations, see Treas. Reg. 1.513-1(b) (“The primary objective
of adoption of the unrelated business income tax was to eliminate a source of unfair
competition by placing the unrelated business activities of certain exempt organizations
upon the same tax basis as the nonexempt business endeavors with which they
compete.”).
156. Supra note 152.
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their general tax-exemption. This charitable purpose rationale can then
justify exempting the investment income of a non-profit from tax.
However, there is no clear parallel to the charitable purpose of a nonprofit entity in the case of a foreign government. Congress has not
clearly identified foreign governments as deserving of a tax exemption,
and therefore the investment income earned by a foreign government
should be treated more like the investment income of a private entity
than like the investment income of a non-profit.
International tax provides another example of the active/passive
distinction in the income tax world. In determining whether or not a
foreign individual has effectively connected income (“ECI”) for U.S. tax
purposes, the Code looks to whether the taxpayer was actively engaged
in the business, or was “merely” trading or investing.157 In this case,
trading or investing on their own do not constitute a trade or business for
U.S. income tax purposes, so income generated by trading or investing
will not be treated as ECI for a foreign investor. If a nonresident
taxpayer does have ECI, that income is taxed at the rates in effect under
§ 1, making the nonresident taxpayer equivalent to the resident taxpayer,
for federal tax purposes. The rationale for taxing ECI at resident tax
rates again stems from a desire not to give tax preferences to foreign
businesses that will advantage the foreign businesses as compared with
their domestic counterparts. However, the tax preference given to
trading and investment income cannot be justified on these same
grounds. On the contrary, exempting investment income or income
earned by trading for one’s own account from the definition of ECI, and
thereby exempting it from the tax rates imposed by § 1, can give a
significant competitive advantage to non-U.S. investors. Therefore, the
same rationale that justifies exempting the investment income of nonprofit entities from tax does not apply in this context.
While it is true that this active/passive distinction is present
throughout the Code, in the sections mentioned above, as well as others,
157. § 871(b) imposes a tax on income earned by a non-resident in a trade or
business. “A nonresident alien individual engaged in trade or business within the United
States during the taxable year shall be taxable as provided in section 1 [establishing
resident tax rates] . . . .” § 871(b)(1). “Trade or business” is defined in § 864, which
states that “the term ‘trade or business within the United States’ . . . does not include . . .
(2) . . . [t]rading in . . . stocks or securities through a resident broker, commission agent,
custodian, or other independent agent . . . [or] trading in stocks or securities for the
taxpayer’s own account, whether by the taxpayer or his employees or through a resident
broker, commission agent, custodian, or other agent . . . .” § 864(b)(2)(A)(i)-(ii).
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a larger discussion of this distinction and its ramifications is outside of
the scope of this Article. Given the changing nature of the economy, and
the increasing presence of passive investors, it may be time to reevaluate the tax preferences available for passive investment income.
Amending the active/passive distinction (in the form of the
commercial/investing distinction) for foreign governments and SWFs
does not necessitate a full re-evaluation of the active/passive distinction
in other parts of the Code. The language describing “commercial” in the
context of § 892 can easily accommodate investment activity, without
implicating the definition of “active” or “passive” in other Code
sections. This narrow focus is part of what makes the foreign sovereign
tax exemption so ripe for change. Any alteration of the law can be done
narrowly, without necessarily implicating other Code sections, where
Congress is not yet prepared to change the law.
VII. TAX EXEMPTION AS NEGOTIATION TOOL
An additional problem with the current form of the foreign
sovereign tax exemption is the universality of the statutory structure.
Since the United States offers a statutory tax exemption to all foreign
sovereigns who invest in the United States, there remains no negotiation
tool to ensure that the United States and its controlled entities and
integral parts receive the same treatment in other countries.158 Under
current law, the United States offers a foreign sovereign tax exemption
to a number of countries that do not offer the same exemption in return.
A country need not have negotiated a tax treaty with the United States in
order to benefit from the foreign sovereign tax exemption. Since it is
provided as a statutory matter, even countries with whom the United
States has never signed a tax treaty are beneficiaries of the provision.
Many of these countries do not have statutory foreign sovereign tax
158. One might argue that we do not always need to receive reciprocal treatment in
order to make a policy decision. In other words, if the policy is good, the United States
should offer it as a statutory matter, regardless of whether other countries provide the
same benefits to the United States. This may be true in other circumstances where there
are good policy justifications for the rule, but, as I have argued in this Article, there is
no good justification for the foreign sovereign tax exemption, so, at a minimum, the
United States should be getting something in return when it offers this subsidy to
foreign governments investing in the U.S.
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exemptions, and therefore the United States does not have the benefit of
an exemption on income it earns in those countries. As a practical
matter, since the United States does not currently have a federal SWF,
there may be less pressure at the national level to seek such an
exemption. However, there are U.S. entities that could benefit from a
provision paralleling the current provision in Section 892. For instance,
the Alaska Permanent Fund and CALPERS are both entities that would
qualify for the benefits of a foreign equivalent of Section 892.159
Arguably, some good things do come out of the statutory provision
of the foreign sovereign tax exemption. The United States primarily
signs tax treaties with wealthier and more politically powerful nations.160
A country with whom the United States has not yet signed a tax treaty
might need the revenue it can generate by investing and earning income
in the United States. That country might benefit tremendously, and
possibly quite justifiably, from the exemption provided statutorily to
foreign sovereigns by Section 892. However, the revenue lost through
the unjustified provision of the exemption to the richest countries
investing the largest amounts in the United States far outweighs the
possible social justice gains at the margins. If the U.S. government
elects to engage in international relief work, it will be much more
effective to engage in the subsidies of foreign governments directly than
to do so through the statutory provision of a tax exemption to all foreign
governments investing and earning income in the United States.
As a foreign policy matter, there is no clear reason why the United
States should offer tax benefits to foreign governments (and their
integral parts and controlled entities) when these benefits are not
available to the United States in return. Indeed, the fact that the
exemption is offered as a statutory matter means that the United States
also provides a tax exemption (and thereby financial support) to
countries that it might not wish to support.161 There is no good policy
reason, neither foreign policy or tax policy, for providing such benefits
while receiving nothing in return.

159. For a discussion of the U.S. entities that would qualify as Sovereign Wealth
Funds, see Fleischer, supra note 1.
160. See, e.g., note 49 for the list of countries with whom the United States has
signed a tax treaty.
161. It is surprising, for instance, to think that at the same moment that we were at
war with Iraq and Afghanistan, our Code was providing an exemption from tax on any
income those governments might have earned in the United States.
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CONCLUSION
I have argued that the current tax treatment of SWFs, as an
extension of the foreign governments that own them, is both unfair and
incomplete. The current model is unfair, because it offers to SWFs an
unjustified additional tax exemption beyond that offered to foreign
private corporate investors. The lack of clear legislative intent
authorizing such a tax preference makes this violation of horizontal
equity indefensible. In addition to this inequity, the current statutory
model is incomplete, as it does not actually achieve the underlying
Congressional goals related to sovereign immunity. The principle of
sovereign immunity aims to exclude foreign sovereigns from U.S.
jurisdiction, including its taxing jurisdiction, when those sovereigns are
engaged in governmental activities. However, the structure of the
foreign sovereign tax exemption statute allows a foreign government to
earn income from its governmental activities which, if that income is not
income from investments, will be subject to tax in the United States.
Therefore, the current statutory model fails on both counts.
In this Article I have proposed that Congress amend Section 892 to
ensure that all income earned by a foreign government engaging in
governmental activities will be exempt from tax in the United States.
Simultaneously, Congress should remove the provision exempting
foreign sovereigns (and, by extension, SWFs) from U.S. tax on
investment income, and instead offer such exemptions, when they are
desirable, through negotiation as a treaty provision. This change would
allow the exemption to be more narrowly tailored to satisfy the goals of
its original enactment, and would also ensure that the United States
receives comparable tax treatment in return.

